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1. Introduction 
Our article examines key aspects of the Greek crisis and explores it under the light of the 
ongoing decline of the European Social Model. It is argued that the austerity measures 
implemented as conditions for receiving consecutive ‘bail-out’ loans have had, so far, a 
very negative impact upon the Greek economy, politics and society. Further, it is argued 
that labour market reforms underway in Greece and the rest of Southern Europe signal 
some very worrying developments with respect to the social dimension of European 
integration. Indeed, especially in the area of collective agreements, when we view these 
reforms from a European perspective we can identify the rise of wage policy 
interventionism by the EU; a new process that ‘combines European requirements for 
national wage and labour market policies with the threat of economic sanctions’ (Busch et 
al (2013:8). In turn this signals the intensification of the (neo) liberalisation of the European 
Social Model and puts under severe doubt the prospects for a more social Europe that will 
prioritize social objectives and rights over economic freedoms.  
The article is structured as follows. The next section deals briefly with the causes of the 
politico-economic crisis in Greece. It is followed by a discussion of the economic and 
political effects of the crisis and the impact of austerity measures and reforms. The article 
continues with a longer section that discusses the impact upon the Greek society and, 
especially on the familistic model of social reproduction in Greece. In its last part, the 
article explores the character of labour market reforms in Greece within the context of the 
ongoing decline of the European Social Model and reflects upon the future prospects for a 
more social Europe.                
 
2. The causes of politico-economic crisis in Greece 
Widespread media reports about a looming Greek economic crisis began in October 2009 
when the, then, newly elected government of PASOK (traditionally, a centre-left party), led 
by George Papandreou, was reportedly ‘surprised’ to discover that Greece’s public budget 
deficit was much higher than previously calculated by the Greek statistical authorities. By 
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April 2010, Greece became the first Eurozone member state to formally seek financial 
assistance from the so-called troika, comprising the International Monetary Fund, the 
European Union and the European Central Bank. The austerity measures and neo-liberal 
economic reforms that accompanied the IMF/EU/ECB so-called ‘bail out’ loans were 
unprecedented, in their scope, severity, volume and speed. Severe cuts in pensions and 
wages, extraordinary increases in taxation and dramatic decreases in public spending in 
most welfare sectors (social security, education, health) accompanied the most extensive 
de-regulation of industrial relations in Greek history and the abolition of many hard-won 
socio-economic rights of numerous professions - both in the public and private sectors (see 
Papadopoulos and Roumpakis 2012). These measures were taken in tandem with an 
overambitious programme of far-reaching reforms in public administration that includes the 
future dismissal of thousands of state employees, further privatisation of state enterprises 
and the selling-off of public property. 
Explanations of the causes of the Greek crisis oscillate between those that give emphasis to 
domestic causes and those that emphasize systemic reasons. For the former, the crisis is 
mainly attributable to the behaviour of a profligate society that 'consumed beyond its 
means', and its corrupt governments that run large public debts and budget deficits. For the 
latter approach, the crisis was the outcome of chronic economic inadequacies and lack of 
policy options within the Euro, mostly outside the country's influence, with domestic 
factors acting as triggers rather than as causes of the crisis. In an earlier work 
(Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2012) we drew from both approaches to argue that the 
eruption of the crisis was the combined result of ‘perfect storm’ conditions, both domestic 
and external and placed it in a historical context of repeated state bankruptcies. We also 
argued that the continuation and deepening of the crisis is a product of the very measures 
that were taken, supposedly, to alleviate it. 
In terms of the domestic causes, the politico-economic regime established after the collapse 
of dictatorship in 1974 used state resources and public borrowing (see Figure 1) not only as 
a means to legitimize the young democracy but also to maintain the political reproduction 
of ruling elites (see Kouvelakis, 2011; Katsimi and Moutos, 2010; Karamesini, 2008) and 
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facilitate their enrichment in the context of the semi-peripheral Greek political economy 
(see Fotopoulos, 1993). Thus, the current crisis in Greece is not purely economic in nature 
but deeply politico-economic. It marks, among other things, the exhaustion of the politico-
economic regime that emerged in Greece in the last 35 years characterized by state 
patronage and clientilism, extensive tax evasion practices (especially of higher earners, 
businesses and powerful individuals) while privileging specific socio-professional groups 
via a fragmented and highly unequal social security system (Petmesidou, 1991 and 2011; 
Venieris, 1997). Further, its corresponding semi-peripheral political economy was 
'benefiting' from the functioning of a substantial underground economy, that utilized 
uninsured and precarious labour, keeping production costs low, while continuing with 
familistic welfare arrangements that 'externalised' the costs of social reproduction to Greek 
families (see Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2013). These costs continued to remain low, 
especially since the mid 1990s, due to the extensive use of migrant workers, most of whom 
where undocumented, especially in the agriculture, construction and domestic/care sectors. 
Regarding the systemic factors, one of the key economic consequences of Greece’s entry in 
the Eurozone in 2001 was the dramatic amplification of the already widening asymmetries 
in productivity and competitiveness between Greece’s semi-peripheral economy and those 
of core EU countries, asymmetries that followed Greece’s entry in the EEC in 1981 (see 
Fotopoulos, 1993). Following the adoption of the Euro, economic growth in the Greek 
economy was maintained primarily by boosting domestic demand through consumption 
and to a lesser extent investment in construction and real estate. While the supply of cheap 
credit from the European Central Bank (ECB) allowed the banking sector to expand 
rapidly, at the same time the real economy did not yield enough streams of revenue to 
prevent the accumulation of a high domestic debt while trade deficit worsened (see also 
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Source: IMF (2011) 
Note: Estimated data for 2012 
 
The combination of these systemic factors contributed towards the ‘twin deficits’ of 
Greece, on government budget and on the current account balance, which deteriorated 
dramatically during the period 1999-2008 (IMF, 2011). The end result was that the negative 
tendencies prior to the entry into Euro (trade deficits, dismantling of the structure of 
production etc.) were further amplified. The lack of the policy option to issue its own 
currency meant that, within Euro, Greece’s semi-peripheral capitalism stood little chance of 
balanced endogenous growth (Lapavitsas, 2011; Polychroniou, 2011) similar to other semi-
peripheral EU economies like Portugal and Ireland (Mansori, 2011).   
3. The politico-economic impact of the crisis and austerity 
measures  
The combined impact of the crisis and the austerity measures does not allow any room for 
optimism, economically, socially or politically. Economically, the rapid decline in domestic 
demand and industrial output was combined with the collapse of bank savings and the 
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closure of hundreds of thousands of small-medium (mostly family-owned) businesses. In 
addition, unemployment has soared and private indebtedness has increased dramatically. 
The real economy is in a dire state, with GDP continuing to contract year after year with 
little or no prospect for growth in the short and medium term future.  Socially, there is 
ample evidence of negative developments in respect to social cohesion, poverty and social 
exclusion, all of which are combined with a dramatic rise in suicides, social unrest and 
social violence more generally, as well as continuous rise in xenophobia and racism. 
Politically, nearly 3 years after the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis, the collapse of the 
two-party system is evident. This collapse was followed by a substantial increase in 
political uncertainty and political polarisation, marked especially by the spectacular rise of 
the extreme right. Indeed, this crisis is deeply politico-economic in nature. It signals the end 
of the politico-economic model adopted since metapolitefsi (the end of military dictatorship 
in 1974) and the violent restructuring of the Greek social formation and especially its 
familistic model of social reproduction.   
Impact on Greek economy and employment   
The austerity measures adopted under the agreements made with the IMF/EC/ECB 
included, among other things, relentless taxation and substantial reductions in pensions and 
wages. In effect, the Greek state has taken billions of Euros out of the (real) Greek 
economy in order to reduce the budget deficit (and serve the debt) and the results, though 
predictable, surprised negatively even the most pessimist analysts. By the end of 2011, the 
Greek GDP had contracted by almost 15% while the Greek government estimated that by 
the end of 2012 the Greek GDP would have contracted by a further 7% (WSJ, 2012). On 
the other hand, according to a confidential report on the sustainability of Greece’s debt 
(IMF/EC/ECB, 2011; see also Eurobank Research, 2011) the debt was estimated to reach 
173% of GDP in 2012, approximately €373 billion, from 120% in 2009, the year prior to 
the IMF/EC/ECB ‘bailout’ loan. In short, while the Greek economy continues to contract, 
the Greek public debt as % of GDP continues to rise.  
Given that the government shares such pessimistic estimations for the state of the economy 
in 2012 (WSJ, 2012) one can only question whether there will be any return to positive 
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rates of GDP growth in the coming years. So far, the rapid decline in domestic demand, 
industrial output and bank savings and the collapse of consumer confidence coincide with 
dramatic increases in unemployment. Indeed, for most Greek citizens of working age, 
reality in the labour market under the austerity measures marked ‘the end of the world’ as 
they knew it. Official unemployment rate more than trippled - from 7.4% in May 2008 to 
nearly 25% in September 2012 (Elstat data reported in FT, 2012) - with women and 
especially young people hit particularly hard. For the Greek youth, migration emerges as 
the main exit route to find employment. By the end of 2012, youth unemployment was 
around 55% and female youth unemployment stood more than 60% (Elstat data reported in 
FT, 2012). In fact, by 2012 Greece was the country with the highest unemployment rate for 
women (see also Figure 2) and second highest for men and youth, after Spain; both in 
Southern Europe and the whole of the EU.    
Figure 2 Unemployment rates in the GIPS states, 2008 and 2012 (%) 
 
Source: Busch et al (2013)  
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Impact on domestic politics   
The economic crisis was accompanied by a political crisis which saw the Papandreou 
government replaced in early November 2011 by a tri-party ‘administrative’ government – 
of dubious constitutionality - comprising PASOK, the (conservative) ‘New Democracy’ 
party and the far right LAOS party. This government was led by the unelected Lukas 
Papademos, who was former vice president of the European Central Bank and ex-advisor to 
G. Papandreou. Papademos’ government lasted from November 2011 to May 2012 and, 
following two general elections in rapid succession (May and June 2012), Papademos was 
replaced by Antonios Samaras, leader of the New Democracy (ND) party, who managed to 
form a coalition government comprising his party, the substantially reduced in electoral 
influence PASOK, and DEMAR, a moderate left-of-centre party. The May 2012 elections 
saw a major change in the political scene in Greece, with more notable developments, the 
electoral collapse of PASOK (from 43.92% of the vote in October 2009 to 12.2% in June 
2012);  the catapulting of SYRIZA, the self-described radical left-wing coalition, from 
4.6% of the vote in 2009 to nearly 27% in June 2012 – narrowly missing becoming the first 
party in votes - and the unprecedented rise of Golden Dawn, an ultra-right racist party with 
neo-Nazi tendencies, which from 0.46% in the May 2009 European elections rose to 6.92% 
in June 2012 general elections.  In short, the traditional two-party system that dominated 
Greek politics since the collapse of military dictatorship in 1974 is now confined to history. 
New political formations are emerging in what is clearly a more polarised political 
environment, where not only the effectiveness but the very legitimacy of austerity measures 
is highly contested 
4. Impact of the crisis and austerity measures on society and the model of 
social reproduction 
Times of crisis are often the best periods to observe key characteristics of social formations 
and their degree of strength or tenacity. During periods of relative stability, such 
characteristics can stay obscure or be rendered invisible by political discourses emphasising 
progress, modernisation or, in the case of Southern Europe, discourses emphasising 
processes of ‘catching-up’ with core European economies and welfare regimes. What the 
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crisis revealed - and not only for Greece but for the rest of Southern Europe - was the 
existing (and now widening) fault lines between Southern and Northern/Western European 
political economies and social formations. We have argued in a previous study 
(Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2012) that the characteristics of South European welfare 
states were not just endogenous by-products of ‘rudimentary’ development but, primarily, 
the results of how their national political economies were integrated in the global and 
European transnational economies. That is, as semi-peripheral economies that relied on 
‘external growth strategies’ where competitiveness was based on the pursuit of low labour-
costs. In turn, this was translated in continuous attempts, on behalf of both employers and 
the state, to minimize their responsibility for social reproduction. As Bakker and Silvey 
(2008:3) argue, “the family and the state become important sites where the needs of social 
reproduction are linked to the need of accumulation and where the state intervenes to offset 
or offload the high costs of social reproduction onto or away from the family at different 
moments in different locales”. Against this background, the political choice by both the main 
parties that governed post-dictatorship Greece to avoid introducing a universal system of 
social protection can be adequately understood. It served well the interests of both 
employers and the state in minimizing their responsibility for social reproduction in a semi-
peripheral political economy. The result was the institutionalization of segmented and 
residual social programmes and welfare policies and reliance on the traditional role that 
family played in Greek society to provide social protection to its members. 
Traditionally, in the familistic model of welfare capitalism in Southern Europe, and 
especially in Greece, the family played a double role as the main institution for social 
protection and care of its members and, simultaneously, as a key institution in the 
reproduction of the particular model of semi–peripheral political economy. The role of the 
family was not confined to household members but involved utilizing an extensive network 
of kin that ‘provides a mechanism for aggregating and redistributing resources among its 
members’ (Allen et al 2004: 116, see also Ferrera, 1996). In a recent study (Papadopoulos 
and Roumpakis, 2013a) we argued that this role was interlinked with the capacity of the 
family to consolidate and mobilise resources as 
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 an owner of property (especially private but also commercial real-estate) 
 an employer (usually via family business) 
 a member of the clientelistic political system  
 a claimant of social security rights (through members able to secure such rights 
through their participation in the formal labour market and especially though public 
sector employment). 
 
Further, we distinguished two periods in the social reproduction of the Greek familistic 
model. The first period, that lasted until the mid-1980s was characterised by strategies of 
‘maximisation of resources’. Greek families employed strategies of low economic risk that 
gave strong emphasis on the accumulation of assets and real estate as key resources for 
their security while avoiding over-exposure to debt and minimising their exposure to the 
‘money nexus’. The second period, roughly from late 1980s until the eruption of the crisis, 
was characterised by strategies of high economic risk which utilised market means for the 
investment and consumption of these resources, strategies that were heavily promoted by 
the state and banks. The excessive borrowing of households in order to invest in the stock 
exchange, in the housing market, or in order to improve their living standards via, what 
proven to be, unsustainable levels of consumption fuelled by cheap credit, resulted in 
remarkable increases in private debt (see Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 2009, Lapavitsas, 
2011). These practices placed the traditional mode of social reproduction already in a crisis 
trajectory, years before the eruption of the Greek sovereign crisis.  
This point can be supported by analysing the evolution of private debt. Despite the fact that 
Greek private debt is significantly lower that other Eurozone countries and the UK, private 
debt and in particular household borrowing boomed a few years before, and especially 
after, the coming of Euro. In fact it increased faster than the public debt (Lapavitsas et al, 
2010) following a trend already set in the 1990s. Since 1994 and up to 2006, the total 
increase of consumer credit touched upon the astronomical figure of 2,106% (Papadopoulos 
and Roumpakis 2009). Sanctioned by the Greek banks, and helped by lower interest rates, 
this expansion of consumer credit was mainly concentrated on mortgages and on consumer 
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loans and left the Greek households exposed to unprecedented levels of debt when the crisis 
erupted.  
 
Further, even before the EU-IMF bailout, the period 1995-2010 was characterised by the 
expansion of precarious jobs in the formal labour market, both in the public and private 
sectors (Karantinos 2006; INE-GSEE 2008). As a precondition for the ‘bail-out’ loan the 
government accepted further moves towards the ‘flexibilization’ of the labour market and 
strengthening of the rights of employers to ‘hire and fire’. Moreover, trade unions would 
lose their right to refer to the Conciliation and Arbitration Service following disputes with 
employers over wage increases and collective agreements (on the European dimension of 
changes in collective agreements see also  below). Additionally, as a precondition for the 
tranche of the 2nd IMF/EU/ECB ’bailout’ plan, the Greek government voted to abolish 
tenure in the public sector. Cornerstones of the Greek labour law are removed fast 
contributing to the intensification of ‘flexibilization’ of the Greek labour market. 
Empirically, this is captured by the significant changes in the number of full and part-time 
contracts signed in 2010 and 2011. New full-time contracts in 2009 represented 79% of all 
contracts. By 2010 they dropped to 66,9% and by 2011 they were further reduced to 60,4%. 
In a reverse fashion, new part-time jobs in 2009 represented 16,7% of all contracts. By 
2010 they increased to 26,1 and by 2011 they reached 30,9%. New casual jobs also 
increased from 4,3% in 2009 to 8,95% in 2011 (Chalaris, 2012). 
 
The combination of exposure to high levels of private indebtedness and increasing 
employment insecurity prior to the crisis meant that the familistic model of social 
reproduction was already quite weak prior to the eruption of the sovereign crisis. The 
adoption of the austerity measures accelerated what was already a looming crisis in the 
familistic model of social reproduction and, in fact, resulted in a paradoxical, and very 
disturbing, development: the social risks, hardships and, ultimately, the responsibility of 
dealing with the impact of the sovereign debt crisis were transferred almost singlehandedly 
to the working population, pensioners and their families, both in the public and private 
sector. While the costs of the sovereign debt crisis are ‘familialized’, Greek families cannot 
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use traditional strategies to protect their members, given that they key pillars of their 
security (relatively protected employment for at least one member of the family and small 
ownership) are under attack.       
 
According to statistics of the National Bank of Greece (NBG 2011), the distribution of 
private debt among household and business debt reached 59.2% and 60,2% of the GDP 
respectively. The same report highlighted serious delays in the payment of mortgages while 
non-payment of consumer loans has reached 20%. More recent surveys in the Athens area 
reported that 6 out of 10 households find it very hard to meet their tax obligations, loans 
and utility bills while 52% reported difficulties in meeting even their basic everyday needs 
(IME-GSEBEE, 2012). Further, according to the latest Eurostat statistics, 31% of the total 
population were at risk of poverty or social exclusion at the end of 2011 with the respective 
figure for children less than 18 at 30.4 %, while the children at risk of monetary poverty of 
parents with low education climbed to 50.2% (Eurostat, 2013; see also Elstat, 2012).   
 
Apart for a small minority, most Greek families experience a dramatic decrease in their 
wellbeing and their socio-economic security, as repeated surveys in subjective economic 
hardship reveal. In 2011 Gallup’s ongoing Global Wellbeing Survey reported 60% of 
Greeks ‘struggling’ with their current life while ‘the percentage of Greeks who rate[d] their 
lives so poorly that they are considered ’suffering’ more than tripled to 25% in 2011, from 
7% in 2007’ (Gallup, 2011a). This was the highest percentage among the Eurozone 
countries and is expected to increase further. Using questions measuring the Index of 
Personal Economic Distress (IPED) an epidemiological study conducted by the Athens 
University Research Institute for Psychiatric Health recorded a nearly 21% increase in 
respondents reporting very high economic distress in comparison to 2009 (URIPH, 2011). 
The same study recorded substantial increases in feelings of melancholy, symptoms of 
clinical depression, suicidal thoughts and self-reported suicidal attempts.  More recent 
comparative studies on the impact of austerity cuts upon health recorded dramatic rises in 
suicides as well as incidence of mental health disorders across Europe, especially in Greece 
and Spain (Coghlan, 2013). According to Violatzis (2011) the total number of suicides 
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doubled in the years of the crisis; an unprecedented development for Greece, a country that 
traditionally recorded one of the lowest suicide rates in the EU. 
 
Change in gender dynamics and lack of public support for families  
 
Despite the very high female unemployment in Greece many women tried to enter again the 
labour market after the crisis. Reflecting on this observation  Karamessini (2011) 
mentioned ‘It’s an attempted defence against the crisis […] As joblessness rises among 
men, a growing pool of women are seeking to offset losses in household income [but] most 
aren’t finding work’. This tendency was confirmed by Paul Swaim, a principal OECD labor 
economist. Although female employment rate in Greece dropped since 2008, female labor 
force participation rate increased by 2.9 percent (almost 3 times E.U. average), which, as 
Swaim argued ‘shows that Greek women ventured into the labor market in a bid to cushion 
the impact of the recession on their family’s income but often failed to find a job, at least 
one that is reported to the government’ (Swaim, 2011).  
 
Further, those lucky who do find jobs, often find positions inferior to their qualifications 
while salaries are so low that the prospect for young couples to have more than one child 
has almost disappeared. At the same time any childbearing plans for childless couples are 
pushed way back in time (see the extensive report of New York Times, 2011).  And more, 
under conditions of high and rising unemployment, with employment rights severely 
curtailed and job insecurity rampant, employers can make the most audacious, and often 
illegal, demands.  It has become almost universal practice ‘in the private sector [that] if you 
look for a job and you are of reproductive age the first thing you have to do is give your 
word of honour that you will not get pregnant’ as Pantazi,  chair of the Women's Union of 
Greece, commented in an interview in the Guardian (2012). Against such developments it 
is reasonable to assume that the already very low fertility rate in Greece (estimated at 1.39 
in 2011) will fall even further.  
 
Moreover, it is expected that severe cuts in the public sector, both in expenditures and in 
terms of personnel, are already having a negative impact upon employment security and it 
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appears that this impact is far more severe upon women than men. Karamessini (2011) 
mentioned that “the state used to represent a guaranteed source of employment for women 
and had boosted gender equality” with almost 60% of female university graduates 
traditionally finding employment in the wider public sector. Further, in a NYT report 
(2011) it was also mentioned that ‘the prospects for female entrepreneurs are also slim as 
small businesses, which constitute 96 percent of all enterprises in Greece, are closing at a 
rate of one in four’.   
 
At the same time, a large number of publicly provided services and sectors (e.g. hospitals, 
schools, universities, welfare services) are facing a double challenge. On the one hand they 
have to offer their services under serious economic constraints, reduced staff and budgetary 
cuts - as the state withdraws its funding. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that 
they are facing substantial rises in the demand for accessing their services given that large 
parts of the middle classes begin withdrawing from private services as their incomes 
diminish and, further, that the demand on the voluntary and non-governmental sector to fill 
the gap will intensify (see Eleftherotypia, 2011 and the Guardian, 2012). Indeed market-
based solutions are no longer an option for many families. As Maria Stratigaki, head of the 
government’s General Secretariat for Gender Equality, mentioned ‘paying for help with 
child care’ is an expense that fewer and fewer women will be able to afford’ (NYT, 2011).  
 
4. The Greek crisis as part of the crisis of the European Social Model 
Against the evidence presented thus far, it is important to see not only the quantitative but 
also the qualitative aspects of the austerity measures and reforms and place them in a wider 
European context. It is evident that the austerity measures and reforms undertaken so far 
(for a detailed discussion of reforms see Venieris, forthcoming) are firmly within a 
neoliberal trajectory which not only affects negatively Greek citizens but contributes to the 
intensification of the (neo)liberalisation of the European Social Model. This dimension was 
recently explored in a comprehensive report by Busch et al (2013) who explored how 
austerity measures in Southern Europe threaten the EU’s Social Dimension. Having 
identified six policy objectives of the European Social Model (macroeconomic policy 
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aimed at full employment, real wage increase reflecting productivity, social security 
offering high levels of protection, employee participation rights, strong public sector, 
priority of social rights over market freedoms incorporated as clause in the EU Treaty) 
Busch et al gathered ample evidence to demonstrate that, aside the causes of the crisis, the 
type of austerity measures and their politico-economic effects in Southern Europe are 
deleterious for the objectives of the European Social Model. They undermine the social 
dimension of EU’s integration process, rendering progressive politics towards a more social 
Europe increasingly impossible.         
For these authors the ‘long march’ of the liberalization of the ESM began years before the 
crisis  of 2008/9 by means of continuous undermining of employment and social rights, 
‘labour market reforms, decentralisation of collective bargaining systems, wage 
moderation, a reduction in relative pension levels, cuts in public health services and 
privatisation of services of general interest’ (p.6). Most of these have taken place in 
Western and Eastern EU member states whereas in Southern Europe the failure of many 
attempts of such reforms can be attributed to serious and sustained defence of hard-won 
rights coming from trade unions and parties of the left. For Busch et al (2013) ‘since the 
global economic crisis of 2008/2009 and austerity policy in the wake of the euro crisis, the 
political and social balance of power has been changing in Southern Europe’ (p.6). This 
marks a major setback in ‘the realisation of a normative concept of a European Social 
Model – which could already be observed before the crisis’ (p.7).  
Box 1 Changes in collective agreements systems in Southern Europe 
(already made or planned for the near future) 
 
- legal extension of opening clauses for enterprise level deviations from branch collective 
agreements (Italy, Portugal, Spain); 
- absolute priority of company agreements over all other collective agreements, with 
simultaneous abolition of the favourability principle (Greece, Spain); 
- the possibility for deviating company agreements with non-trade union workers’ 
representations (Greece, Portugal); 
- limitation of the validity of collective agreements after expiry (Greece, Spain); 
- formal restriction of the general validity of collective agreements (Portugal) 
 
Source: Busch et al (2013:5) 
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One of the most worrying developments is the rise of EU’s new wage policy 
interventionism which ‘combines European requirements for national wage and labour 
market policies with the threat of economic sanctions’ (Busch et al, 2013:8). It takes place 
against the background of an explosive increase in unemployment in Southern Europe and 
is used as a power resource for legitimising and implementing structural reforms against 
collective agreement systems that traditionally offered high levels of coverage among the 
working population (see Box 1). In particular, under the rhetorical guise of improving the 
quality of economic coordination in the EU, and using the new Euro Plus Pact as a legal 
framework, wage policy is now explicitly considered as part of European economic 
governance and in fact ‘the most important adjustment variable for promoting 
competitiveness’ (Busch et al, 2013:8). Not only this goes against the fundamental 
principle of the ‘voluntary’ nature of the contract between labour and capital in a labour 
market but violates the EU Treaty itself which explicitly rules out any EU competence in 
respect to wage policies (Article 153, paragraph 5). If we combine this negative 
development with the prioritisation of economic ‘freedoms’ over collective labour rights 
that is being witnessed over the last decade in key rulings of the European Court of Justice 
in cases pertaining cross-border industrial relations (see Papadopoulos and Roumpakis, 
2013b), we can only conclude that the future of national collective agreements - probably 
the most fundamental institutionalised power resource for European workers - is now 
seriously under question across Europe. Calling it a new form of authoritarian 
neoliberalism, Busch et al (2013) lament the developments in Southern Europe where ‘in a 
short time historically developed institutions have been destroyed and reshaped in 
accordance with a neoliberal master plan under the auspices of the Troika’ (p.13).  
 
Conclusion: Anti-social policy in Greece amidst the rise of authoritarian 
neoliberalism in Europe   
If we adopt the classic normative view of social policy - originally developed by authors 
like Otto von Zwiedineck-Siidenhorst to describe sets of policies that place the cohesion of 
society at their core (Cahnman and Schmitt 1979: 51) - then the sum of the austerity 
measures and reforms adopted by successive Greek governments can be indisputably 
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characterised as anti-social policy. With large numbers of households and family business 
indebted, record high unemployment and poverty rates, and successive closure of hundreds 
of thousands of small businesses, middle classes in Greece are facing a free fall in their 
incomes and an unprecedented assault in their socio-economic security. The strategy of 
internal devaluation promoted by the troika and adopted by the Greek governments, the 
cuts in salaries, benefits and pension entitlements, and the imposition of a highly regressive 
tax system, continues to place Greece in a downward spiral of a prolonged recession from 
which no end is in sight. At the end 2012 the Debt to GDP ratio exceeded 172% of GDP, 
from 120% in 2009, the year prior to the ‘bailout loan’ agreement. Moreover, at the end of 
the year of writing this article (2013), Greek GDP is expected to shrink by a further 4.5%, 
bringing the total contraction of GDP to 25%, since 2008 (Elstat, 2013).  
Out of the ruins of the traditional familistic mode of social reproduction, undermined by 
more than a decade of indebtedness and almost 3 years of relentless austerity, a political 
economy of generalised insecurity emerges. Although nearly all social risks are 
‘familialized’, access to resources for social protection is severely restricted for large 
number of Greek families. The electoral collapse of the established political parties that 
supported the austerity measures, the rise of political polarisation, xenophobia and racism, 
the rise of poverty and social dislocation, the dissolution of social cohesion and the re-
affirmation of defensive nationalism against what is perceived as a massive attack on 
national sovereignty are only a few of the socio-political outcomes of the crisis and the 
anti-social policies currently implemented. Combined with massive unemployment and 
underemployment, increases in employment insecurity, the removal of hard-won socio-
economic rights, and continuous attacks on incomes and assets, they create a nightmare 
scenario for socio-political stability amidst continuing economic decline. Indeed, the Greek 
social formation faces its biggest challenge since WWII. As long as the measures adopted 
in Greece, and the rest of the Southern Europe, continue their catastrophic impact upon the 
economy, politics and society there is little hope that the current trajectory of integration in 
a market-driven federalist EU will change. Under such conditions, it is perhaps now, more 
than ever in the post-war European history, that a new path is desperately needed to revive 
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not only the Southern European economies and societies but the European Social Model 
itself, placing it firmly at the centre of European integration. 
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